

TOPICS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Class time and room: M 2-5 pm, HC 2-17
Instructor: Rob Wilson
Office: Humanities 4-73
Office hours: M 11-12; W 4.30-5.30
Phone: 492-8994
e-mail: rob.wilson@ualberta.ca
websites: <http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/philosophy/>
<http://www.ualberta.ca/~philosop/faculty/wilson/>

A. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO THE COURSE

This is a seminar course whose special theme for Winter 2003 is "The Individual in the Fragile Sciences". The debate between individualists and externalists about the mind stems from the work of Hilary Putnam and Tyler Burge in the 1970s, and it has been central to the philosophy of mind since then. Individualists, such as Jerry Fodor, Ned Block, and Steve Stich, hold that mental or psychological states supervene on the intrinsic, physical properties of individuals. Externalists, such as Putnam and Burge, deny this.

This perhaps seemingly simple-sounding issue has implications for a range of topics in the field, including mental causation, the relationship between the cognitive and other sciences, how we conceptualize experience or phenomenology, and accounts of intentionality or mental content. We will discuss such topics, and move from them to consider individualistic views in the *biological* sciences. In particular, following a three-week introductory section, we will examine an externalist view of the mind over a four-week period or so, before turning to discuss genetics and development, organisms, and debates over the units or levels of selection in the philosophy of biology. See F below for more on the direction to and content of the course.

Please feel free to come and chat about any aspect of the course, either during my regular office hours or by appointment outside of them. I have voice-mail in my office, and am on e-mail regularly, though typically not over weekends. I am most likely to be in my office on Monday, Wednesday, and Friday.

B. BACKGROUND FOR THE COURSE

The course has no specific course requirements other than those generally for 400/500-level courses in the department, and has been designed with this in mind. That having been said, be warned that some of the reading for the course is difficult, though perhaps not exceptionally so for the level of the courses.

Students who are taking the course but concerned about their background preparation for the course should come and talk to me as early as possible; such concerns are often misplaced, though I will also recommend some additional, introductory readings that may be

of use. [For those whose anxieties preclude approaching me, I recommend that you take a look at either George Graham's *The Philosophy of Mind* (Blackwell, 1991) or Kim Sterelny's *The Representational Theory of Mind* (Blackwell, 1990), both written as fairly introductory texts.] The reading guide organized by topic in **G** below may also be of use here, though note that most of the readings listed there are for further readings on topics covered in the course.

C. COURSE MATERIALS

The core reading for the course will be a book manuscript of the instructor's, *The Individual in the Fragile Sciences I: Cognition* that is available from the Campus Bookstore. There will be a few other supplemental readings, and I would also like to cover at least some of the companion volume, *Biology*, in the second half of the course. But I will hold off assigning that for sure until we get into the course a little and I get some sense of your collective interests, background, and abilities. If we need to spend more time on the material from *Cognition*, or on supplementary readings, then we'll scale back on what we cover from *Biology*. And if we do that, then I may just assign independent, self-contained papers that correspond to chapters from the *Biology* manuscript, rather than the manuscript itself.

A book listed for the course in the departmental course guide, *Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind* (Cambridge University Press, 1995), is no longer required reading. But since it is the precursor to the two books we will draw on in the course, some of you may find it of use or interest. I shall place the library copy on reserve.

For those who wish to pursue some of the topics that we will discuss, the briefly annotated reading guide in **H** below may be of interest and use. Students need not have completed this reading list prior to coming to the second class.

D. WORKLOAD AND COURSE REQUIREMENTS

The reading load for this semester is moderate-high in quantity and level: it is on average about 50 book pages per week and spread fairly evenly through the semester. You should expect to have to read most of the assigned readings carefully, and in most cases, more than once. If it turns out that this is too ambitious a reading load, we will scale back as necessary. The writing load for the course is moderate.

For **undergraduates** the assessment will be determined as follows:

Short assignment due in Week 3:	10%
Short paper due around Week 8:	20%
Term paper due just after the end of classes:	40%
Class preparation and participation:	30%

The last of these will be assigned in increments at roughly one-third and two-thirds through the course, and at the end of classes. Thus, antecedent to the last few weeks of class you will have 50% of your final grade in hand; at the end of classes, this moves to 60%. Undergraduates can also expect to be assessed by standards appropriate to their undergraduate standing.

The assessment scheme for **graduate students** will be as follows:

Short assignment due in Week 3:	10%
Short paper due around Week 8:	20%
Term paper due just after the end of classes:	50%
Class preparation and participation:	20%

The last of these will be assigned in increments at roughly halfway through the course and at the end of classes. Thus, after roughly Week 9, you will have 40% of your final grade determined, and antecedent to the final paper, that will rise to 50%. Graduate students can also expect to be assessed by standards appropriate to their graduate standing.

I will aim to make your progressive grades available to you as quickly as I can. I expect to turn assignments and papers back within a week with written comments. Unless undergraduates individually or collectively express an interest in having written comments on their final papers, these will be omitted; in my experience, they are wasted effort, since many undergraduates do not even pick up their term papers.

You are encouraged to start work (however tentatively) on the **term paper** shortly after paper topics are distributed in Week 8 or 9. I would be happy to discuss a draft of the term paper in advance of its deadline.

In general, **late papers** are not particularly welcome, and you should (i) talk to me in advance about a paper which will not be submitted by the due date, (ii) expect to be penalized for a late paper that does not have a written extension from me. The going rate for deductions for papers that are submitted late but not in accord with both (i) and (ii) is about 10% per day. Incomplete grades will not be given in this course, except in cases of documented family and medical emergencies. Please keep up with the work for the course as you go, and avoid massive disappointments at its conclusion.

E. CLASSES

Regular attendance of the class is required, for much of the work will be done through class discussion; irregular attendance, in the extreme case, will be grounds for failing the course. If you find the class meetings boring, too easy, too difficult, or a waste of time, please let me know directly and early on in the course rather than by not turning up at all. Remember, if you find the class meetings particularly irksome, it is likely that others do, too, and I hope you find me approachable about changes to the content or style of the course.

I envisage splitting most class periods into two parts, the first shorter than the second. In the first part, I will provide a brief overview of some of the main issues from the week's readings. This will not be a summary of the assigned readings, but will aim to set the broader context for them, and raise some questions for you to think about. After a short break, we will discuss the assigned readings for that week, questions and issues you raise both in and antecedent to the class, and other issues as they arise. At the end of each class I will give you some "**starter questions**" to think about for the following class, as well as assign the specific readings for that week.

For in-class discussion to be most effectively, I would encourage you to e-mail me questions and comments you have **before 10 am on the Monday of class**. These can range

from purely "I don't understand X" questions (for any X ... some subset of which I may be able to answer), through to detailed critiques, concerns about, and problems with the substance of the assigned readings. **This interaction constitutes an important part of your preparation for classes** and participation in the course more generally, and I will weigh it together with your in-class participation in determining the participation component to your grade final grade.

There will be no class presentations from students. Despite being the "method of choice" for upper-level or graduate seminars, in my view these seldom make for effective discussion in the class as a whole, and often do more harm than good for the person presenting. My emphasis will be on encouraging you to keep your participation at a steady level throughout the course, and on including you all in class-based discussion each week.

F. A TENTATIVE SCHEDULE

The following schedule should give you some idea of the direction to the course, and the questions some idea of the sorts of issues that we will cover. (By the way, I envisage you being actually able to *answer* these questions at the end of each of these sections of the course.)

In light of my comments in **C** above, take the "tentative" in "tentative schedule" seriously; we may scale back or otherwise adjust the course if we find that we need more time or background on the material I am planning to cover in the first half or so of the course.

Introductory Issues (Weeks 1 - 3):

What is individualism (or internalism) in psychology? What motivates individualism? What are the Putnam-Burge thought-experiments, and why think that they support externalism? How does individualism relate to physicalism about the mind? To functionalism? How might individualistic positions in the cognitive, biological, and social sciences be related to one another?

Readings: IFS I: ch.1; Burge, "Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990", *Philosophical Review* 101:3-51, esp. pp.22-51. IFS II: ch.2

The Externalist View of the Mind (Weeks 4 - 7):

What role does the idea of a wide realization play in externalism? Why has cognitive science been individualistic? Are there plausible views of computation and representation that are not individualistic? What is the TESEE conception of consciousness, and how plausible is it? What is the relationship between intentionality and phenomenology?

Readings: IFS I: chh.3-7; one chapter per week, except we'll do chh.6-7 together.

Individuals, Individualism, and Biology (Weeks 9-12)

Is sub-organismic biology individualistic? Why or why not? What are the chief problems facing the tripartite view of organisms? What is the most plausible way to understand the group mind hypothesis? What does the myxoma case imply about the debate over the levels of selection? Why might one be a pluralist about individual and group selection?

Readings: IFS II: chh.1-2 (together), and chh.5, 6-7, 8 in consecutive weeks.

G. FURTHER READINGS BY TOPIC

Below is a selective guide to about 120 readings on individualism and externalism in the philosophy of mind that we won't have time to discuss in the course. They are, sadly, nearly all by philosophers. I have arranged the readings under the following headings.

General Introductions
 Classic and Early Work
 Mental Causation and Explanation
 Intentionality
 Narrow Content
 Consciousness, Phenomenology, and Experience
 Marr's Theory of Vision
 Other Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science
 Philosophy of Language / Mind Interface

There is some inevitable arbitrariness in where some of these readings are slotted. For full references and brief descriptions of each of these readings, please see **H** below.

General Introductions

Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness*.
 Tyler Burge 1992, "Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990", *Phil. Review* 100:3-51.
 Jerry Fodor 1981, *RePresentations*.
 John Heil 1992, *The Nature of True Minds*.
 Gregory McCulloch 1995, *The Mind and Its World*.
 Kim Sterelny 1990, *The Representational Theory of Mind*.
 Rob Wilson 1995, *Cartesian Psychology & Physical Minds: Individualism & the Sciences of the Mind*.

Classic and Early Work

Tyler Burge, 1979, "Individualism and the Mental", in P. French, T. Uehling Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol.4, Metaphysics.
 Tyler Burge 1982a, "Two Thought Experiments Reviewed", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 23:284-293.
 Tyler Burge 1982b, "Other Bodies", in Woodfield 1982.
 Tyler Burge 1988, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", *Journal of Philosophy* 85:649-663.
 Jerry Fodor 1987, *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind*.
 Brian Loar 1988a, "Social Content and Psychological Content", in Grimm and Merrill 1988.
 Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.) 1986, *Subject, Thought, and Context*.
 Putnam, H., 1975, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", in K. Gunderson (ed.), *Language, Mind and Knowledge*. Reprinted in H. Putnam, *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers vol.2*.
 Gabriel Segal 1989, "Seeing What is Not There", *Philosophical Review* 98:189-214.
 Stephen Stich 1978, "Autonomous Psychology & the Belief-Desire Thesis", *Monist* 61:573-591.
 Stephen Stich 1983, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief*
 Andrew Woodfield (ed.) 1982, *Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality*.

Mental Causation and Explanation

- Michael Antony 1993, "Social Relations and the Individuation of Thought", *Mind* 102:247-261.
- Lynne Rudder Baker 1995, *Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind*.
- David Braun 1991, "Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 69:375-389.
- Tyler Burge 1989, "Individuation and Causation in Psychology", *Pacific Phil. Quart.* 70:303-322.
- Tyler Burge 1993, "Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice", in Heil and Mele 1993.
- Tim Crane 1991, "All the Difference in the World", *Philosophical Quarterly* 41:1-25.
- Frances Egan 1991, "Must Psychology Be Individualistic?", *Philosophical Review* 100:179-203.
- Frances Egan 1999, "In Defense of Narrow Mindedness", *Mind and Language*, 14:177-194.
- John Heil and Al Mele, eds. 1993, *Mental Causation*.
- Terence Horgan, 1993, "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World", *Mind*, 102:555-86.
- Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 1988, "Functionalism and Broad Content", *Mind* 97:381-400.
- Jaegwon Kim 1993, *Supervenience and Mind*.
- Patricia Kitcher 1985 "Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism", *Phil. of Science* 52:78-97.
- Joseph Owens 1987, "In Defence of a Different Doppelganger", *Phil. Review* 96:521-554.
- Joseph Owens 1993, "Content, Causation, and Psychophysical Supervenience", *Philosophy of Science* 60:242-261.
- Robert van Gulick, 1989, 'Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work', in S. Silvers (ed), *Rerepresentation*.
- Rob Wilson 1992, "Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation", *Phil. Studies* 68:103-139.
- Rob Wilson 2001, "Two Views of Realization", *Philosophical Studies* 104:1-31.
- Steve Yablo 1992, "Mental Causation", *Philosophical Review* 101, pp.245-280.

Intentionality

- Lynne Rudder Baker 1987, *Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism*.
- Akeel Bilgrami 1992, *Belief and Content*.
- Ned Block 1986 "Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 10 (*Philosophy of Mind*), pp.615-678.
- Tyler Burge 1986b, "Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception", in Pettit and McDowell 1986, pp.117-136.
- Tyler Burge 1986c, "Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind", *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (December 1986), pp.697-720.
- Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 1998, "The Extended Mind", *Analysis* 58:10-23.
- Daniel Dennett 1987, *The Intentional Stance*.
- Ray Elugardo 1993, "Burge on Content", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53:368-384.
- Hartry Field 1978, "Mental Representation", in Block, *Readings in the Phil. of Psychology*, vol.2.
- Jerry Fodor 1994, *The Elm and the Expert*.
- Jerry Fodor 1990, *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*.
- David Houghton 1997, "Mental Content and External Representations", *Phil. Quart.* 47:159-177.
- Brian Loar 1988b, 'Reply: A New Kind of Content', in Grimm and Merrill 1988.
- John McDowell 1993, *Mind and World*.
- Colin McGinn 1989, *Mental Content*.
- Ruth Garrett Millikan 1993, *White Queen Psychology: Essays for Alice*.
- Sarah Patterson 1990, "The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions", *Phil. Studies* 59:313-332.
- Philip Pettit 1993, *The Common Mind*.
- Denis Walsh, 1998, "Wide Content Individualism", *Mind* 107:625-651.

Narrow Content

- Fred Adams, D. Drebusenko, G. Fuller, and R. Stecker 1990, "Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly", *Mind and Language* 5:213-229.
- Louise Antony, 1990, "Semantic Anorexia: on the Notion of 'Content' in Cognitive Science", in G. Boolos (ed.) *Meaning and Method*.
- Ned Block 1991, "What Narrow Content is Not", in B. Loewer and G. Rey, *Meaning in Mind*.
- Martin Davies 1986, "Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, pp.263-283.
- Daniel Dennett 1982, "Beyond Belief", in A. Woodfield 1982. Reprinted in Dennett 1987.
- Michael Devitt 1990, "A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind", in W. Lycan (ed.) *Mind and Cognition*.
- Jerry Fodor 1982, "Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 23:98-118.
- Jerry Fodor 1991, "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content", *Journal of Philosophy* 5-26.
- Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 1993, "Some Content is Narrow", in Heil & Mele 1993:259-282.
- Gabriel Segal 2000, *A Slim Book About Narrow Content*.
- Robert Stalnaker 1989, "On What's in the Head", *Philosophical Perspectives* 8, pp.287-316.
- Robert Stalnaker 1990, "Narrow Content", reprinted in his *Context and Content*.
- Stephen Stich 1991, "Fat Syntax Meets Skinny Semantics", Loewer and Rey, *Fodor & his Critics*.
- Stephen White 1991, *The Unity of the Self*.

Consciousness, Phenomenology, and Experience

- Ned Block 1990, "Inverted Earth", *Philosophical Perspectives* 4, pp.51-79. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 1997, pp.677-693.
- Martin Davies 1995, "Externalism and Experience", in A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J.M. Larrazabal (eds.), *Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning*. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 1997, pp.309-327.
- Daniel Dennett 1991, *Consciousness Explained*.
- Fred Dretske, 1996a, *Naturalizing the Mind*.
- Fred Dretske, 1996b, "Phenomenal Externalism", in E. Villanueva (ed.), *Perception*. Philosophical Issues 7.
- Terence Horgan and John Tienson, 2002, "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality", in D. J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*.
- Susan Hurley, 1998, *Consciousness in Action*.
- Susan Hurley 2001, "Perception and Action: Alternative Views", *Synthese*, 129:3-40.
- Brian Loar 2002, "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia", in Q. Smith and A. Jolic (eds.), *Consciousness: New Essays*.
- Brian Loar 2003, "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content", in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*.
- J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, 2001a, "What it is Like to See: a Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience", *Synthese*, 129:79-103..
- J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë 2001b, "A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 24(5): 939-972.
- William Lycan 1996, *Consciousness and Experience*.
- William Lycan in press, "The Case for Phenomenal Externalism", in *Philosophical Perspectives*.

Marr's Theory of Vision

- Tyler Burge 1986a, "Individualism and Psychology", *Philosophical Review* 95:3-45.
- Keith Butler 1996, "Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision", *Mind and Language*, 11:313-337.
- Keith Butler 1998, "Content, Computation, and Individuation", *Synthese*, 114:277-292.
- Frances Egan 1992, "Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content", *Mind* 101:443-459.
- Frances Egan 1995, "Computation and Content", *Philosophical Review*, 104:181-203.
- Patricia Kitcher 1988, "Marr's Computational Theory of Vision", *Philosophy of Science* pp.1-24.
- Peter Morton 1993, "Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory", *Philosophy of Science* 60, pp.86-99.
- Gabriel Segal 1991, "In Defense of a Reasonable Individualism", *Mind* 100, pp.485-494.
- Lawrence Shapiro 1993, "Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision", *Philosophical Review* 102, pp.489-513.
- Lawrence Shapiro 1997, 'A Clearer Vision', *Philosophy of Science* 64:131-153.

Other Cognitive Science and Philosophy of Science

- Andy Clark 2001, "Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind", *Mind and Language* 16:121-145.
- Noam Chomsky 1995, "Language and Nature", *Mind* 104:1-61.
- Jerry Fodor 1975, *The Language of Thought*.
- Jerry Fodor 1983, *The Modularity of Mind*.
- Jerry Fodor 1998, *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong*.
- Jerry Fodor 2000, *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way*.
- John Haugeland 1995, "Mind Embodied and Embedded", reprinted in his *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind*.
- Ron McClamrock 1995, *Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World*.
- Ruth Garrett Millikan 2000, *On Clear and Confused Ideas*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Sarah Patterson 1991, "Individualism and Semantic Development", *Phil. of Science* pp.15-35..
- Steven Pinker, 1997, *How the Mind Works*.
- Mark Rowlands 1999, *The Body in Mind*.
- John Searle 1984, *Minds, Brains and Science*.
- John Searle 1992, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*.
- Denis Walsh 1999, "Alternative Individualism", *Philosophy of Science* 66:628-648.
- Rob Wilson, 2000a, "The Mind Beyond Itself", in D. Sperber, *Metarepresentations*.
- Rob Wilson 2000b, "Some Problems for 'Alternative Individualism'", *Phil. Science* 67:671-679.

Philosophy of Language / Mind Interface

- Kent Bach 1987, *Thought and Reference*.
- Gareth Evans 1982, *The Varieties of Reference*.
- John McDowell 1986, "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space", in Pettit and McDowell 1986, pp.137-168.
- Ruth Garrett Millikan 1984, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*.
- Christopher Peacocke 1981, "Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation", *Synthese* 49, pp.187-217.
- Francois Recanati 1993, *Direct Reference*.

One way to use **G** is to find a topic that appeals to you, and then use **H** to home in on the specific readings that seem most suited to your purposes. One way to use **H** is to find authors who interest you, and trace some links between them, going back to **G** in order to get a better sense of the lay of the land on some of these topics. **Both should be used for writing papers.**

H. ANNOTATED READING GUIDE

This guide is restricted to articles and books in English that discuss individualism in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, though many of these cast a wider net. The annotations are brief and, in some cases, idiosyncratic and opinionated, but they may serve to direct your attention if you want to pursue a given topic either during or after the course.

Corrections and further suggestions are welcome.

1. Fred Adams, D. Drebusenko, G. Fuller, and R. Stecker 1990, "Narrow Content: Fodor's Folly", *Mind and Language* 5:213-229. A pointed attack on attempts, particularly Fodor's in his 1982 and 1987, to develop a notion of narrow content.
2. Louise Antony, 1990, "Semantic Anorexia: on the Notion of 'Content' in Cognitive Science", in G. Boolos (ed.) *Meaning and Method*. An attack on some recent accounts of narrow content.
3. Michael Antony, "Social Relations and the Individuation of Thought", *Mind* (1993), pp.247-261. An argument for the conclusion that an individual's social relations are inessential to the nature of that individual's thoughts which offers a reinterpretation of the thought experiments in Burge 1979. Reminiscent of Unger 1984 on semantic relativity.
4. Kent Bach 1987, *Thought and Reference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Concentrates on singular terms, thought and reference. The final chapter, "Reference and Natural Kinds" is of most direct relevance to those interested in the Kripke-Putnam-Burge triad.
5. Lynne Rudder Baker 1987, *Saving Belief: A Critique of Physicalism*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. While purporting to be a general critique of physicalism, really an attack on individualism, instrumentalism, and eliminativism about psychology that concentrates on folk psychology.
6. Lynne Rudder Baker 1995, *Explaining Attitudes: A Practical Approach to the Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press. A development of her 1987 with more emphasis on articulating a positive conception of mind.
7. Akeel Bilgrami 1992, *Belief and Content*. New York: Basil Blackwell. Defends both the unity of content and what he calls the "locality" of content. Bilgrami characterizes his view as "individualistic externalism", and a good question is whether individualism or externalism gets the upper hand here.
8. Ned Block 1986 "Advertisement for a Semantics for Psychology", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 10 (*Philosophy of Mind*), pp.615-678. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Outlines 8 desiderata for any semantics appropriate for cognitive science, and then argues that his own "two factor" conceptual role semantics fits the bill.
9. Ned Block 1990, "Inverted Earth", *Philosophical Perspectives* 4, pp.51-79. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 1997, pp.677-693. Develops a complicated variant on inverted spectrum and Twin Earth stories to argue against representationalist views of phenomenal experience.
10. Ned Block 1991, "What Narrow Content is Not", in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), *Meaning in Mind*. New York: Blackwell. A contribution to a festschrift for Fodor that attacks Fodor's own account of narrow content in his 1987.

11. Ned Block, Owen Flanagan, and Güven Güzeldere (eds.), *The Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. The most comprehensive anthology on consciousness, containing many classic and recent papers, including Block 1990 and Davies 1995.
12. David Braun 1991, "Content, Causation, and Cognitive Science", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 69:375-389. Defends the view that while the usual, explanatory-based arguments for doing cognitive science without a (wide) notion of content are flawed, we just can't tell (now) whether cognitive science needs a notion of content or not.
13. Tyler Burge, 1979, "Individualism and the Mental", in P. French, T. Uehling Jr., and H. Wettstein (eds.), *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, vol.4, Metaphysics. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. One of the Ur-papers on individualism that still repays careful reading, almost 25 years later.
14. Tyler Burge 1982a, "Two Thought Experiments Reviewed", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 23:284-293. A reply to Fodor 1982 that appears in an issue of the journal devoted to discussion of the implications of Twin Earth for semantics and psychology.
15. Tyler Burge 1982b, "Other Bodies", in Woodfield 1982. An attempt to put some distance between himself and Putnam that also contains an early expression of doubt about the possibility of a narrow notion of content.
16. Tyler Burge 1986a, "Individualism and Psychology", *Philosophical Review* 95:3-45. In some ways the most accessible of Burge's papers; the first half recounts the thought experiments and makes some general points; the second half argues that Marr's theory of vision is non-individualistic.
17. Tyler Burge 1986b, "Cartesian Error and the Objectivity of Perception", in Pettit and McDowell 1986, pp.117-136. After some introductory, historical remarks, here Burge offers a version of one of the arguments given in his 1986a on Marr's theory of vision, here w.r.t. the objectivity of perception in general.
18. Tyler Burge 1986c, "Intellectual Norms and the Foundations of Mind", *Journal of Philosophy* 83 (December 1986), pp.697-720. A more epistemically motivated argument for Burge's anti-individualism.
19. Tyler Burge 1988, "Individualism and Self-Knowledge", *Journal of Philosophy* 85:649-663. States the prima facie tension between the rejection of individualism and the authority of self-knowledge, and proposes a solution to the problem.
20. Tyler Burge 1989, "Individuation and Causation in Psychology", *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 70:303-322. A response to Fodor's 1987 objections to the notion of causation that Burge relies on in Burge 1979, 1982a, 1986a.
21. Tyler Burge 1992, "Philosophy of Language and Mind: 1950-1990", *Philosophical Review* 100:3-51. A valuable general review of some dominant trends in philosophy of mind and language since 1950.
22. Tyler Burge 1993, "Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory Practice", in Heil and Mele 1993. Argues, on the heels of a passing suggestion in his 1979, that token identity theories provide no help in understanding mental causation; our explanatory practices rather than philosophical metaphysics should guide us here.
23. Keith Butler 1996, "Individualism and Marr's Computational Theory of Vision", *Mind and Language*, 11:313-337. Attacks Shapiro 1993 and defends an individualistic view of Marr's theory of vision that is distinct from that of Segal 1989.
24. Keith Butler 1998, "Content, Computation, and Individuation", *Synthese*, 114:277-292. Focused largely on Egan 1995 and her claim that content plays a non-realist role in Marr's theory of vision, but argues that rejection of this view doesn't lead to anti-individualism.

25. Noam Chomsky 1995, "Language and Nature", *Mind* 104:1-61. Goes after Putnam and Burge with much rhetorical flourish as part of a broader advocacy of his defence of "I-languages" over "E-language" alternatives.
26. Andy Clark 2001, "Reasons, Robots and the Extended Mind", *Mind and Language* 16:121-145. Develops the extended mind idea in the context of recent work in "embodied cognition" and dynamic approaches within robotics.
27. Andy Clark and David Chalmers, 1998, "The Extended Mind", *Analysis* 58:10-23. Argues that we take the idea of the mind extending beyond the body seriously.
28. Tim Crane 1991, "All the Difference in the World", *Philosophical Quarterly* 41:1-25. Challenges the consensus on the significance of the Putnam-Burge arguments by making some claims about the nature of causation that removes the problem to which that consensus is a response.
29. Martin Davies 1986, "Externality, Psychological Explanation, and Narrow Content", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, pp.263-283. A response to an earlier version of Fodor 1987:ch.2 that discusses the claim that there is a divergence between common sense and psychology w.r.t. content and Fodor's own proposal regarding narrow content.
30. Martin Davies 1991, "Individualism and Perceptual Content", *Mind* 100, 461-484. Argues, following Burge, that Marr's theory of vision uses a notion of wide content.
31. Martin Davies 1995, "Externalism and Experience", in A. Clark, J. Ezquerro, and J.M. Larrazabal (eds.), *Philosophy and Cognitive Science: Categories, Consciousness, and Reasoning*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. Reprinted in Block, Flanagan, and Güzeldere 1997, pp.309-327. Articulates a form of externalism with respect to phenomenal experience and phenomenal content.
32. Daniel Dennett 1982, "Beyond Belief", in A. Woodfield 1982. A long paper whose chief relevance here is its introduction of the idea of a notional world. Cf. Stalnaker 1989.
33. Daniel Dennett 1987, *The Intentional Stance*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A collection of mostly published papers, including "True Believers: The Intentional Strategy and Why it Works" (1981), "Three Kinds of Intentional Psychology" (1981), and "Beyond Belief" (1982), together with postscripts to most of the papers.
34. Daniel Dennett 1991, *Consciousness Explained*. Boston, MA: Little Brown. A sort of extension of Dennett's intentional stance to consciousness, developed with a more explicitly eliminativist twist.
35. Michael Devitt 1990, "A Narrow Representational Theory of the Mind", in W. Lycan (ed.) *Mind and Cognition*. Devitt's shot at narrow content.
36. Fred Dretske, 1996a, *Naturalizing the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Develops Dretske's earlier work on perception within an externalist framework, with chapters on introspection, qualia, consciousness, and supervenience.
37. Fred Dretske, 1996b, "Phenomenal Externalism", in E. Villanueva (ed.), *Perception*. Philosophical Issues 7. Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview. A defence of the eponymous view that is short and sweet.
38. Frances Egan 1991, "Must Psychology Be Individualistic?", *Philosophical Review* 100:179-203. Argues that while general arguments for individualism fail, insofar as psychology is computational, it is individualistic. Also follows Loar 1988 in arguing against the anti-individualistic conclusions drawn from the Putnam-Burge thought experiment, and against Burge's interpretation of Marr.
39. Frances Egan 1992, "Individualism, Computation, and Perceptual Content", *Mind* 101:443-459. Argues for the view that a proper understanding of the role of content in cognitive science (esp. in Marr's theory of vision) undermines both the narrow content program and the claim that content is wide. Also argues that computational individuation is individualistic.

40. Frances Egan 1995, "Computation and Content", *Philosophical Review*, 104:181-203. Further develops her argument in her 1992 and casts it in a more general framework in the philosophy of science.
41. Frances Egan 1999, "In Defense of Narrow Mindedness", *Mind and Language*, 14:177-194. Attempts to show that a proper understanding of computational explanation is consistent with narrow taxonomies, and that these latter are to be preferred
42. Ray Elugardo 1993, "Burge on Content", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 53:368-384. Challenges the coherence of Burge's interpretations of his own thought experiments.
43. Gareth Evans 1982, *The Varieties of Reference*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. The book at the root of recent Neo-Frussellian accounts of reference and thought. Chh.1-5 are perhaps of most relevance, esp.chh.4-5.
44. Hartry Field 1978, "Mental Representation", in Ned Block, *Readings in the Philosophy of Psychology, vol.2*. Harvard University Press. An early articulation of a sort of two factor semantic theory, with only the conceptual role factor being relevant to psychology.
45. Jerry Fodor 1975, *The Language of Thought*. New York: Thomas Crowell. The classic expression of Fodor's language of thought hypothesis.
46. Jerry Fodor 1981, *RePresentations*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A collection of Fodor's essays that contains "Propositional Attitudes", "Methodological Solipsism Considered as a Research Strategy in Cognitive Psychology". His introduction to this volume is also informative as an introduction to philosophy and cognitive science circa 1981.
47. Jerry Fodor 1982, "Cognitive Science and the Twin-Earth Problem", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 23:98-118. Contains an early attempt of Fodor's to formulate a notion of narrow content in phenomenological terms. Cf. Burge 1982a.
48. Jerry Fodor 1983, *The Modularity of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Argues that the mind has a highly modular structure, and that where capacities are not modular ("central processes"), cognitive science can expect to make little real progress. Cf. also his 2000.
49. Jerry Fodor 1987, *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Classic Fodor, with chapters defending folk psychology and individualism and attacking meaning holism and other evils.
50. Jerry Fodor 1990, *A Theory of Content and Other Essays*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Another collection of Fodor essays, these written since 1981. Perhaps most noted for the two eponymous essays, which were new with the volume.
51. Jerry Fodor 1991, "A Modal Argument for Narrow Content", *Journal of Philosophy* 5-26. A second shot at the account of narrow content discussed in his 1987, and taken more seriously than it deserved to be.
52. Jerry Fodor 1994, *The Elm and the Expert*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Witty, irreverent, and not without a few signs of desperation, as Fodor continues to grapple with the conciliation of intentionality with the computational nature of thought. Does Fodor here give up on the notion of narrow content, or is he just playing?
53. Jerry Fodor 1998, *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong*. New York: Oxford University Press. A tirade against pretty much everything that psychologists, linguists, and philosophers have said about concepts in the last 50 years.
54. Jerry Fodor 2000, *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Argues for the limitations to cognitive science implied by taking the scope of the modularity thesis defended in his 1983 seriously; one of these is that evolutionary psychology is bunk. The title parodies Pinker 1997, and the book is a response, of sorts, to it.
55. John Haugeland 1995, "Mind Embodied and Embedded", reprinted in his *Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998, pp.207-237. An account of the mind that emphasizes the "incorporeal interfaces" in real-life cognition,

- with some discussion of work in classic and contemporary artificial intelligence. Some affinities with Chalmers and Clark 1998, McDowell 1994, and the work of Dreyfus.
56. John Heil 1992, *The Nature of True Minds*. New York: Cambridge University Press. A solid, advanced introduction to core topics in the philosophy of mind, including supervenience, individualism, and intentionality.
 57. John Heil and Al Mele, eds. 1993, *Mental Causation*. New York: Oxford University Press. An interesting anthology of commissioned papers from some big players: e.g., Davidson, Kim, Sosa, Dretske, Millikan and Burge. I especially recommend the 2nd of the papers by Kim and Sosa, and that by Jackson and Pettit.
 58. Terence Horgan, 1993, "From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World", *Mind*, 102:555-86. An excellent review article on supervenience and the philosophy of mind whose suggestions for "where the action will be" can now be checked, 10 years later.
 59. Terence Horgan and John Tienson, 2002, "The Intentionality of Phenomenology and the Phenomenology of Intentionality", in D. J. Chalmers (ed.), *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York: Oxford University Press. Defends the idea that there is a necessary connection between intentionality and phenomenology of some kind, and that both are narrow.
 60. David Houghton, 1997, "Mental Content and External Representations", *Philosophical Quarterly*, 47:159-177. Discusses why we should take the role of external representations seriously in thinking about mental content. Cf. to Haugeland 1995, Clark and Chalmers 1998.
 61. Susan Hurley, 1998, *Consciousness in Action*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. A tour de force or relatively independent chapters that challenges a number of dominant views of consciousness and thought experiments (e.g., Block's Inverted Earth) commonly used in the consciousness literature.
 62. Susan Hurley 2001, "Perception and Action: Alternative Views", *Synthese*, 129:3-40. A 40-page introduction to some of the views developed in Hurley 1998.
 63. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 1988, "Functionalism and Broad Content", *Mind* 97:381-400. Argues that functionalism is compatible with ascriptions of 'broad (or wide) content, and makes a case for the explanatory utility of wide content as what they call "programme explanations".
 64. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit 1993, "Some Content is Narrow", in Heil and Mele 1993, pp.259-282. A fairly commonsense defence of a species of narrow content.
 65. Jaegwon Kim 1993, *Supervenience and Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press. A collection of influential papers on both topics mentioned in the title and their relationship. Worth having just to have all these in one place. Chapters 13, 14 and 16 are especially recommended.
 66. Patricia Kitcher 1985 "Narrow Taxonomy and Wide Functionalism", *Philosophy of Science* 52:78-97. Argues for a middle ground position that defends computational psychology as individualistic but allows (wide) content to play a role in psychological explanation.
 67. Patricia Kitcher 1988, "Marr's Computational Theory of Vision", *Philosophy of Science* pp.1-24. An early paper that defends the wide nature Marr's theory.
 68. Brian Loar 1988a, "Social Content and Psychological Content", in Grimm and Merrill 1988. Widely regarded as one of the best responses to Burge and as providing the basis for an account of narrow content.
 69. Brian Loar 1988b, 'Reply: A New Kind of Content', in Grimm and Merrill 1988. Responds to Bilgrami's comments on Loar 1988a and clarifies the views there.
 70. Brian Loar 2002, "Transparent Experience and the Availability of Qualia", in Q. Smith and A. Jokic (eds.), *Consciousness: New Essays*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Develops a position similar to that of Horgan and Tienson 2002, offering an alternative to the fashion for phenomenal externalism.

71. Brian Loar 2003, "Phenomenal Intentionality as the Basis of Mental Content", in M. Hahn and B. Ramberg (eds.), *Reflections and Replies: Essays on the Philosophy of Tyler Burge*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A more extensive treatment of the idea of phenomenal intentionality and its foundational status in any account of mental content.
72. William Lycan 1996, *Consciousness and Experience*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Defends an across-the-board functionalism about consciousness and intentionality familiar from his 1987 book on consciousness.
73. William Lycan in press, "The Case for Phenomenal Externalism", in *Philosophical Perspectives*. As the title suggests, a defence of externalism about the phenomenal, via a representationalist account.
74. Ron McClamrock 1995, *Existential Cognition: Computational Minds in the World*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Articulation of an externalist view that is informed about recent work in AI and psychology as well as philosophically sensible.
75. Gregory McCulloch 1995, *The Mind and Its World*. London: Routledge. Belongs to a series that introduces contemporary themes through the history of philosophy. Chapter 7 "Twin Earth" and Chapter 8 "Internalism and Externalism" provide clear introductions to issues relevant to this course.
76. John McDowell 1986, "Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space", in Pettit and McDowell 1986, pp.137-168. Develops an anti-Cartesian view of the mental by discussing Russell's view of singular thought. Tough going.
77. John McDowell 1993, *Mind and World*. Harvard University Press. A much-anticipated book that develops McDowell's Sellars-inspired exploration of the "space of reasons" and the "space of nature". Chapters on non-conceptual content and rationality, with a Kantian vein running through it.
78. Colin McGinn 1989, *Mental Content*. New York: Basil Blackwell. A wide-ranging and at time insightful exploration of intentionality and externalism that wanders a lot and whose organization might have been more user friendly (the first chapter is 120 pages).
79. Ruth Garrett Millikan 1984, *Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mind-blowingly original when it came out. Millikanese has now become more widespread, largely through the subsequent papers collected in her 1993. Provides, amongst other things, a teleofunctional, externalist account of thought.
80. Ruth Garrett Millikan 1993, *White Queen Psychology: Essays for Alice*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Contains papers that help explain her 1984, as well as several long, new papers (chh.7-8, 14, amounting to 120 pages or so) that move discussion in new directions.
81. Ruth Garrett Millikan 2000, *On Clear and Confused Ideas*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Primarily on concepts, a book that developed from her 1998 paper in *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* and the commentaries on it.
82. Peter Morton 1993, "Supervenience and Computational Explanation in Vision Theory", *Philosophy of Science* 60, pp.86-99. Argues that Marr's theory of vision is not individualistic.
83. J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë, 2001a, "What it is Like to See: a Sensorimotor Theory of Perceptual Experience", *Synthese*, 129:79-103. Pretty much a digest of their 2001b.
84. J. Kevin O'Regan and Alva Noë 2001b, "A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness", *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* 24(5): 939-972. Proposes that visual consciousness is an action, and develops this idea in externalist-friendly ways; many affinities to Dennett's views of consciousness.
85. Joseph Owens 1987, "In Defence of a Different Doppelganger", *Philosophical Review* 96, pp.521-554. Argues that although there is a conflict between psychophysical supervenience and individuation by content, this poses no problem for intentionality

since there are no good reasons to accept individualism.

86. Joseph Owens 1993, "Content, Causation, and Psychophysical Supervenience", *Philosophy of Science* 60:242-261. Takes up a theme from Fodor (1987:ch.2) and equivocates in much the way that Fodor himself does on "causal powers".
87. Sarah Patterson 1990, "The Explanatory Role of Belief Ascriptions", *Philosophical Studies* 59, pp.313-332. With a flag to Loar 1988a, makes a case for individualism about belief.
88. Sarah Patterson 1991, "Individualism and Semantic Development", *Philosophy of Science* pp.15-35. Argues for an individualistic interpretation of recent studies in developmental linguistics while rejecting a commitment to global individualism.
89. Christopher Peacocke 1981, "Demonstrative Thought and Psychological Explanation", *Synthese* 49, pp.187-217. Argues that demonstrative thought is crucial for psychological explanation and that makes a case for the salience of Fregean modes of presentation.
90. Philip Pettit 1993, *The Common Mind*. New York: Oxford University Press. A wide-ranging book that covers topics in philosophy of mind, social science, and political philosophy in its three parts. Defends an anti-individualist view of the mind and offers a solution to the Kripkenstein puzzle about rule-following
91. Philip Pettit and John McDowell (eds.) 1986, *Subject, Thought, and Context*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. A volume devoted to the relationships between subject, thought, and context in light of Putnam-Burge thought, with an all-star and largely British cast.
92. Steven Pinker, 1997, *How the Mind Works*. New York: Norton. A popularization that provides a good introduction to the computational theory of cognition, and expresses Pinker's conversion to evolutionary psychology. Cf. Fodor 2000.
93. Putnam, H., 1975, "The Meaning of 'Meaning'", in K. Gunderson (ed.), *Language, Mind and Knowledge*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. Reprinted in H. Putnam, *Mind, Language, and Reality: Philosophical Papers vol.2*. New York: Cambridge University Press. With Burge 1979, the Ur-paper for contemporary work on externalism. Source for Twin Earth fantasies and the development of Putnam's earlier ideas about reference.
94. Francois Recanati 1993, *Direct Reference*. Like Bach 1987, a work principally in the philosophy of language, but that takes on broad issues concerning thought and content. Chh.11-12, while not completely self-contained, are independent enough to convey the gist of Recanati's views on mental content.
95. Mark Rowlands 1999, *The Body in Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Defends an externalist view of the mind that emphasizes the embodied nature of cognition, and marries this a teleological view of content.
96. John Searle 1984, *Minds, Brains and Science*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Searle's critique of artificial intelligence, developing his 1980 *Behavioral and Brain Sciences* paper. Although Searle has not entered the debate over individualism explicitly, his views place him squarely on the individualist side of the divide.
97. John Searle 1992, *The Rediscovery of the Mind*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Searle's indictment of everything that has happened in philosophy of mind in the last 40 years. Provocative and stimulating, even if he resorts to caricature more often than he thinks.
98. Gabriel Segal 1989, "Seeing What is Not There", *Philosophical Review* 98:189-214. The best response to Burge 1986a on Marr that I know of.
99. Gabriel Segal 1991, "In Defense of a Reasonable Individualism", *Mind* 100, pp.485-494. Further defence of the view that Marr's theory of vision is individualistic, directed this time at Davies 1991, with broader overtures.
100. Gabriel Segal 2000, *A Slim Book About Narrow Content*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Divides Putnam-style from Burge-style externalism, and attempts to regain some conceded ground for individualists.
101. Lawrence Shapiro 1993, "Content, Kinds, and Individualism in Marr's Theory of Vision", *Philosophical Review* 102, pp.489-513. A complicated paper that argues that the standard

- test employed to determine whether a given psychological theory (in this case, Marr's) is individualistic is inadequate.
102. Lawrence Shapiro 1997, 'A Clearer Vision', *Philosophy of Science* 64:131-153. Argues against the view of Marr's theory as content-free that Egan has defended, and outlines the role of content in the theory of vision.
 103. Robert Stalnaker 1989, "On What's in the Head", *Philosophical Perspectives* 8, pp.287-316. Also in his *Context and Content*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.169-193. An influential response to revisionist proposals regarding content in light of the Putnam-Burge thought experiments. Discusses Dennett's "notional worlds" and White's "partial character" as bases for accounts of narrow content.
 104. Robert Stalnaker 1990, "Narrow Content", reprinted in his *Context and Content*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998, pp.194-209. With a focus on Loar 1988a, argues that there are problems with internalist views of content.
 105. Kim Sterelny 1990, *The Representational Theory of Mind*. New York: Basil Blackwell. One of the best introductions to contemporary philosophy of mind; has chapters on Marr's theory of vision (ch.4) and individualism (ch.5); opinionated in the author's usual style.
 106. Stephen Stich 1978, "Autonomous Psychology and the Belief-Desire Thesis", *Monist* 61, pp.573-591. Stich's initial statement of the principle of autonomy and an argument for its incompatibility with folk psychology.
 107. Stephen Stich 1983, *From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A defence of eliminativism that explores some alternatives to folk psychology, including what Stich calls "the syntactic theory of the mind".
 108. Stephen Stich 1991, "Fat Syntax Meets Skinny Semantics", in B. Loewer and G. Rey (eds.), *Fodor and his Critics*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Discusses Stich's preferred content-free view of cognition with views of narrow content.
 109. Robert van Gulick, 1989, "Metaphysical Arguments for Internalism and Why They Don't Work", in S. Silvers (ed), *Rerepresentation*. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer. An early response to Fodor's 1987 with echoes in Egan 1991 and Wilson 1992.
 110. Denis Walsh, 1998, "Wide Content Individualism", *Mind* 107:625-651. Attempt to chalk out a middle-ground position between individualism and externalism that strives to preserve much of Fodor 1987.
 111. Denis Walsh 1999, "Alternative Individualism", *Philosophy of Science* 66:628-648. A defence of the position in Walsh 1998 that appeals to the taxonomy of Hox genes in genetics to bolster that position.
 112. Stephen White 1991, *The Unity of the Self*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. A collection of White's essays. Noteworthy are the first two chapters, which introduce and develop the account of narrow content associated with Fodor 1987.
 113. Rob Wilson 1992, "Individualism, Causal Powers, and Explanation", *Philosophical Studies* 68:103-139. A critique of the influential argument of Fodor (1987:ch.2).
 114. Rob Wilson 1995, *Cartesian Psychology and Physical Minds: Individualism and the Sciences of the Mind*. New York: Cambridge University Press. Extended discussion of individualism and its relation to intentionality, mental causation, folk psychology, and cognitive science.
 115. Rob Wilson, 2000a, "The Mind Beyond Itself", in D. Sperber (ed.), *Metarepresentations: A Multidisciplinary Perspective*. New York: Oxford University Press, pp.31-52. Introduces many of the ideas developed more fully in chh.4-5 of *The Individual in the Fragile Sciences I: Cognition*, including that of locational externalism.
 116. Rob Wilson 2000b, "Some Problems for 'Alternative Individualism'", *Philosophy of Science* 67 (December 2000):671-679. A critique of Walsh 1998 and 1999 that argues that there is no middle ground and that the analysis of the Hox genes case is mistaken.

117. Rob Wilson 2001, "Two Views of Realization", *Philosophical Studies* 104:1-31. Critiques the dominant view of realization and develops a contextualist alternative to it that attempts to give metaphysical oomph to externalism
118. Andrew Woodfield (ed) 1982, *Thought and Object: Essays on Intentionality* Oxford: Oxford University Press. An early collection of papers by Dennett, Burge, Bach, Stich, McGinn, and Woodfield.
119. Steve Yablo 1992, "Mental Causation", *Philosophical Review* 101, pp.245-280. A fairly dazzling, ontologically serious paper (nearly all of which appears in his "Cause and Essence", Synthese) that deftly defends the counter-intuitive view that the relation of mental to physical is that of determinable to determinate.

I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT

Choose **two** related readings from either **G** or **H** above. Read them and answer the following questions about them:

1. What are these papers or books about, and why did you choose them?
2. Focussing on just one claim made in your selected readings, make a case for why that claim is true, or why it is false. Should we accept that claim, or should we reject it? Why?

The assignment should be typed, double-spaced, and submitted with a word count. For undergraduates, the assignment should be **500** words or less. For graduate students, the assignment should be **1000** words or less.

Due date: Friday, 24th January, 2002, 12 noon, main office.