A Puzzle about Material Constitution & How to Solve it: Enriching Constitution Views in Metaphysics

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1. Two Intuitions and a Puzzle

“Constitution” may be a philosophical term of art, but the idea of one thing’s being materially constituted by another thing (or other things) is one that ordinary folk are perfectly familiar with. When we talk explicitly of something’s being made up of, being made of, consisting of, or being composed of a material thing or things, we appeal to the concept of material constitution. Sentences that ascribe relations of material constitution can elicit widespread intuitions. Consider (A) and (B):

(A) The liquid in this glass is constituted by molecules of water.

(B) The statue in front of me, David, is constituted by a piece of marble.

(A) and (B) are not only perfectly intelligible sentences but sentences that would be widely agreed to express propositions that could be true, given their utterance in the right sorts of everyday context. For (A) such a context could be one in which there is a glass of water before speaker and hearer, and the speaker is explaining to a chemically naïve hearer what is in the glass. For (B) such a context could be one in which the speaker is standing before Michelangelo’s David marveling at the aesthetic power of what Michelangelo has managed to produce through the artistic medium of sculpture. If our speakers had used ‘is made of’, ‘is made up of’, ‘consists of’, or ‘is composed of’ in place of “is constituted by” in (A) and (B), they would normally be taken to have said (roughly) the same thing as they actually say in uttering (A) and (B).

There is no puzzle in this. A puzzle does arise, however, when we turn to consider two sentences, (A*) and (B*), that are entailed or strongly supported by (A) and (B), respectively:

(A*) The liquid in this glass is nothing more than molecules of water.
(B*) The statue in front of me, David, is more than simply a piece of marble.

(A*) is derived from (A), and (B*) from (B), by substituting the italicized phrase for “is constituted by”. Again, both (A*) and (B*) are perfectly intelligible, and the contexts already specified for (A) and (B) are ones in which each could be uttered to express a truth. For some, this will occasion no surprise, since they would take (A*) to be a paraphrase or entailment of (A), and (B*) to be a paraphrase or entailment of (B). The puzzle is how (A*) and (B*) could both say something true, given their relationship to (A) and (B).

For those with more fine-grained views of meaning resistant to the claims above concerning the relationship between (A) and (A*), and (B) and (B*), a version of the puzzle remains. For the truth of (A*), even if not equivalent to or implied by (A), is at least supported by (A) in that someone who held (A) would be reasonably justified also in holding (A*). Likewise, for (B) and (B*). Someone who held that a certain liquid is materially constituted by (is made of, consists of, is composed of) molecules of water would have reason also to endorse some kind of deflationary view of a glass of that liquid and its molecular constituents. Yet someone who held that a statue is materially constituted by (is made of, consists of, is composed of) a given piece of marble would have reason to reject such a view of the relationship between the statue and its constituent. The puzzle, again, is how both of these things could be true.

This paper resolves the puzzle by articulating a particular account of the metaphysics of material constitution. While I shall build on the work of other constitution theorists — especially the recent work of Lynne Baker — what is distinctive of my approach is the idea that

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2. For a recent overview of the principal analyses of material constitution that have been offered, as well as a sketch of his own “deflationary view”, which holds that “there is no deep metaphysical relation of constitution, as distinct from material coincidence” (p. 708), see Ryan Wasserman, “The Constitution Question”, Noûs 38 (2004): 693–710. The view I develop here is as much an alternative to the single-concept analyses that Wasserman surveys as it is to the skepticism about constitution that Wasserman’s deflationary view expresses.

3. Such diversity pervades the literature on constitution. For a small sampling of the range of uses of “constitution” in motivating examples in the recent
A Puzzle about Material Constitution

(1) This [piece of marble] is constituted by some marble (or a material body).
(2) Adam’s body is constituted by organic molecules.
(3) The organic molecules in this cell are constituted by physical particles.
(4) This chain is constituted by metal links.

The terms in these sentences include demonstratives, mass terms, count nouns, and plural referring expressions. Like (A), each of (1) – (4) readily admits of a deflationary reading of material constitution:

(1*) The piece of marble is nothing more than some marble (or a material body).
(2*) Adam’s body is nothing more than organic molecules.
(3*) The organic molecules in this cell are nothing more than physical particles.
(4*) This chain is nothing more than metal links.

It is easy enough to construct simple, everyday contexts in which each of (1) – (4) could be uttered so as to be true, each of which would also be a context in which, respectively, (1*) – (4*) would be true. For example, (3) and (3*) might be true when uttered in the context of a teacher’s explaining that organic chemistry has a physical basis, or in motivating the discipline of biochemistry, even if she might use “are made up of” rather than “are constituted by” in expressing the proposition that (3) expresses.

The same general point is true of (B): it belongs to a larger family of sentences, each of which readily admits of the reading of “is constituted by” that I have ascribed to (B):

(5) Adam is constituted by organic molecules.
(6) Michelangelo’s David is constituted by some marble.
(7) This gene is constituted by a sequence of DNA.
(8) This island is constituted by a particular landmass.

In each of these cases, as with (B), it is easy to construct a familiar context that generates intuitions that the particular thing constituted is something more than its material constituent or constituents, which again can be referred to by a singular or plural term, or a count or a mass noun. For example, (7) and its derivative (7*)

(7*) This gene is more than simply a sequence of DNA.

might both be uttered truly in a context in which various functional features of that gene (e.g., its essential regulatory or inhibitory roles) were under discussion. The puzzle, again, is why this intuitive difference exists between (A) and (1) – (4), on the one hand, and B and (5) – (8), on the other.

Given that these contrasts at least motivate the idea that there may be distinct concepts of constitution at work here, the next step is to provide a capsule statement of what I take to be the crucial difference between those concepts, one that suggests distinct analyses.

When some particular entity y is compositionally constituted by some entity x or some entities the xs, y’s existence is necessitated sim-
A Puzzle about Material Constitution

Adopt a realist view of ontology. Many of the objects recognized in our everyday ontology exist independently of how we conceive of those objects, and of the theories we entertain about them.

Although these can be construed as independent desiderata, I shall refer to them collectively as Common Sense Ontology. Much could be said about them (including the trade offs and tensions between them), and any broader defense of the metaphysics of constitution would surely do so.⁴

3. Material Constitution

As forms of material constitution, compositional and ampiative constitution share several features that derive from the motivations for recognizing a relation of material constitution in the first place.

The first of these features is that each relates objects or aggregations of objects that are spatially and materially coincident for some extended period of time, ρ, where one object or a plurality of objects is the (completely) material constituent of the other.⁵ Two or more entities are spatially coincident during ρ just if they occupy exactly the same space during ρ, and they are materially coincident during ρ just if they share exactly the same matter during ρ. Two or more flight paths can share some of the same space, and two roads can share some of the same matter, in cases where they overlap (spatially or materially, respectively). Spatial and material coincidence involve complete or to-

⁴ Here is one germane issue about Common Sense Ontology. One might wonder what these desiderata imply about the view that persons should receive some special kind of metaphysical treatment. While there are respects in which persons occupy a special place in everyday ontology, I do not think it is part of our commitments that persons must be treated distinctively. Thus, Common Sense Ontology is compatible with the metaphysics we develop to deal with persons being general enough to apply to other cases. For a version of this idea, see Dean Zimmerman’s ‘Material People’, in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (editors), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), esp. section 1.4.

A Puzzle about Material Constitution

reasoning implies that the same is true of the liquid in a glass and the molecules of water that constitute it.

This suggests two necessary conditions for some entity \(y\) to be either ampliatively or compositionally constituted by some entity \(x\), or some entities the \(xs\), during some time period \(p\):

- **Coincidence**: \(x\) is completely material in itself, or the \(xs\) are completely material in themselves, and \(y\) is spatially and materially coincident with \(x\) (the \(xs\)) during \(p\).
- **Distinctness**: it is possible for \(x\) (the \(xs\)) to exist without there being anything of \(y\)'s type that is (even partially) spatially and materially coincident with \(x\) (the \(xs\)).

I shall propose that our two concepts of constitution differ in what conditions they accept in addition to these, and that this difference itself turns on precisely how composition and the part-whole relation enter into the analysis of constitution. Since many would take coincidence itself to imply that entities in a relation of constitution share, at least at some level, all of their parts, and would to that extent at least require some account of composition and the relation between parts and wholes, let me first say something about this before moving on to discuss compositional and ampliative constitution in turn.

I have said that for two entities to materially coincide for some time \(p\) is for them to share exactly the same matter during \(p\), an analysis that makes no mention of the sharing of parts. If this is sufficient as an account of what material coincidence is, as I think it is, then since it does not mention the relation between parts and whole, one can include coincidence as a necessary condition on constitution without appealing to the sharing of parts or the part-whole relation.


7. Although Lynne Baker’s eschewal of mereology in her Persons and Bodies (see pp. 179–85) is one of the more strongly contested features of her account of constitution, note the mereological element in her “Unity Without Identity”, p. 149. For a sense of the debate here, see the exchange between Baker and Dean Zimmerman: Zimmerman, “Persons and Bodies: Constitution Without Mereology?”, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 64 (2002): 599–606; Baker, “Replies”; and Zimmerman, “The Constitution of Persons by
Since ideas and formal theories that appeal to the part-whole relation have been influential in metaphysics in general and in discussions of material constitution in particular, even were one to accept that we have an adequate non-mereological understanding of material coincidence, one might well wonder why avoiding an appeal to something called “mereology” is a virtue in this context. Here it is important to distinguish what, modifying a convention introduced by Peter Simons (1987: 5–6), I shall call (small-m) mereological views, which are any views that appeal substantially to the relation between parts and wholes, from (big-M) Mereological views, which are specific, often formally articulated theoretical frameworks, the best-known of which are Lesniewski’s “calculus of manifolds”, and Leonard and Goodman’s “calculus of individuals”. The chief reservations that proponents of constitution views have expressed about appeals to part-whole relations are reservations about Mereology, in these classic and more recent formulations.

One such reservation turns on the assumption of standard Mereology that there is one part-whole relation, and correspondingly one theory that articulates that relation’s formal properties. Yet we appeal to part-whole relations in a wide variety of contexts, and it is at best controversial to assume that there is a single relation that is referred to across these contexts. In a recent survey article, Achille Varzi gives a representative sampling of the kinds of context in which part-whole relations that relate “material bodies, events, geometric entities, or geographic regions … as well as numbers, sets, types, or properties” are invoked, making it clear that “[M]ereology assumes no ontological restriction on the field of ‘part’.” Consider three examples where mereological relations are invoked:


A Puzzle about Material Constitution

(9) My arm is part of my body.
(10) The number one is part of the set of odd numbers.
(11) Tibbs the cat is part of the fusion of cats.

In accordance with the generality of Mereology, all of these appeals to mereology are treated as referring to a single part-whole relation, one governed by certain formal principles. Yet an arm is a physical component of my body, the number one an element in the set of odd numbers, and an individual organism a member of a species. Prima facie, these relations are distinct. The concern is that any theory that treats them uniformly will be as prone to generating confusion in projects that fall under the umbrella of Common Sense Ontology as would any approach that treated the following sentences as articulating a single “is” relation:

(12) Cicero is Tully.
(13) The statue is the clay.
(14) A cat is an animal.

Just as we have learned to distinguish identity (12), material constitution (13), and instantiation (14) — amongst other relations that ‘is’ might be used to refer to — perhaps we need also to recognize distinct relations that ‘is part of’ can be used to refer to. In the context of analyzing material constitution, better to start with a conception of material coincidence that remains neutral about whether ‘constitution’ and ‘coincidence’ apply univocally across domains beyond the material.

A related concern in this context is that the ways in which Mereological theories characterize “the” part-whole relation make that relation ill suited for articulating a notion of material coincidence and so material constitution. Consider two examples.

First, classical extensional Mereology construes the part-whole relation
tion as a partial ordering, *i.e.*, as reflexive, asymmetrical, and transitive. Yet it is very counter-intuitive to view the relation referred to in (9) and (11) as reflexive, since material things are not usually viewed as parts of themselves. A common response to this objection is that Mereology allows a definition of a notion of a proper part in terms of this notion of part, with identity being the limit of the part-whole relation. If this is to serve an analysis of material coincidence, however, and in turn in an analysis of material constitution, it entails that we view identity as the limit of material coincidence. Perhaps that is an acceptable view of material coincidence (and perhaps even of material constitution), but in light of the attention given by constitution theorists to *distinguishing* constitution from identity, it would seem prudent to avoid building this into one’s view of constitution from the outset.

Second, a central component in extensional Mereological theories is the claim that entities with exactly the same proper parts are identical. David Lewis refers to this as the *uniqueness of composition*, and it stands in *prima facie* tension with the idea that there can be distinct objects that materially coincide, at least if that notion of coincidence is to be understood in terms of Mereology. Again, this provides some reason for foregoing the formal power of Mereology in explicating a notion of material coincidence distinct from that of identity.

Although I have been expressing caution about using Mereology to explicate the notion of material coincidence, and so about viewing material constitution in general through the lens of Mereology, mereology does have some place in one concept of material constitution — namely, that of compositional constitution.

### 4. Compositional Constitution

Suppose that we accept Coincidence and Distinctness as necessary conditions that any concept of constitution must satisfy:


At an intuitive (and metaphorical) level, I have suggested that compositional constitution implies a relatively high degree of “closeness” between constituted and constituent entities. A natural additional condition for a concept of compositional constitution that explains or cashes out this metaphor of closeness is *Intrinsic Necessitation*:

**Intrinsic Necessitation**: $x$ is in some intrinsic state(s), or the $xs$ that compose $y$ are arranged, during $p$ such that $x$ itself, or the $xs$ themselves, necessitate the existence of $y$.

This condition partly demarcates a concept of constitution that accounts for the intuitions about (A) and (1)–(4) with which we began. In particular, Intrinsic Necessitation provides an explanation of why there is a sense in which constituted entities are nothing more than their constituents, one that goes beyond whatever explanation is provided for this by Coincidence. And insofar as Intrinsic Necessitation is a condition that does not hold of the concept of constitution appealed to in (B) and (5)–(8), it also provides part of a robust solution to the original puzzle concerning the difference between (A*) and (B*).

Like identity, compositional constitution is transitive. Yet the Distinctness condition makes the relation of compositional constitution irreflexive, and so different from identity. What of symmetry? Both Distinctness and Intrinsic Necessitation are formulated in asymmetrical terms — in terms of what is possible for *constituents* and in terms of what states or arrangements of those constituents necessitate, respectively — but this itself doesn’t entail the asymmetry of the resulting relation. To ensure that compositional constitution is asymmetric, and so comport with intuitions about (A) and (1)–(4), we need the converse of Distinctness to fail:
CONSTITUENT NECESSITATION: whenever y exists, there must be something of x’s type that is (at least partially) spatially and materially coincident with y.

This suggests a second dimension to the “closeness” between constituents and what they compositionally constitute: that they, or something of their type, are necessitated by the existence of what they actually constitute.

To illustrate how these two conditions apply to a concrete example, and to bring out some of the implications of this view of constitution, consider (A) again:

(A) The liquid in this glass is constituted by molecules of water.

Intrinsic Necessitation entails that during the period of constitution φ, those molecules are so arranged as to necessitate the existence of the liquid in this glass. Such an arrangement might involve their spatial location in the glass in the lattice structure typical of liquids. There may be several such arrangements, and so (A) may be made true by their succession during φ. Note, however, that any such arrangement or succession of arrangements do not themselves compositionally constitute the liquid in this glass, since they will fail to satisfy Distinctness.11

This final point is an important result of the analysis of compositional constitution I am offering, in part because the corresponding claim is not true of ampliative constitution, as we will see. The claim itself may seem counterintuitive or obscure due to my reliance on common (but casual) talk of arrangements as putative constituents. Since arrangements of plural entities are just ways those constituents are organized or structured, their way of being, much as intrinsic states of an individual constituent are ways that entity is, we might restate and clarify what I have said by considering (A), which expresses a constitution claim that I am committed to rejecting:

(A) The liquid in this glass is constituted by water molecules arranged just so.

Here the italicized trailing phrase directs us specifically to “the arrangement” entailed by Intrinsic Necessitation’s application to (A). In less reified language, my point is that that very arranging of water molecules cannot be a constituent of the liquid in this glass, and that is because it is not possible to have that very arranging of water molecules, that very way of being those water molecules, without having the liquid in this glass. We can precisely explain why in terms of the analysis of compositional constitution. Consider the way of being the water molecules referred to in (A) as a putative compositional constituent of the liquid in this glass. Setting aside questions of whether Intrinsic and Constituent Necessitation even make sense were such “arrangings” to be considered constituents, there would be an inconsistency between the former of these conditions and Distinctness. There is a way of being any plural constituent that necessitates the existence of what they constitute (in accord with Intrinsic Necessitation), but for that very reason, while the plural constituents themselves may satisfy Distinctness, that “arrangement” cannot. The same is true of a succession of arrangements.

If the direction of Intrinsic Necessitation is from constituent to constituted entity — from bottom to top, as it were — then the direction of Constituent Necessitation, conversely, is from top to bottom. It entails that it is not possible for there to be the very liquid in this glass without there being at least some molecules of water that spatially and materially coincide with that liquid at least partially. Likewise, for the constituents in each of (1) – (4) (some marble, organic molecules, physical particles, and metal links), each of which must spatially and materially coincide (at least partially) with the entity they constitute (respectively, a specific piece of marble, Adam’s body, organic molecules in a particular cell, and a particular chain) whenever that constituted entity exists. Just how partial this spatial and material coincidence must be likely varies from case to case. But since a constitution relation can

11. The same is true of the intrinsic state(s) of individual constituents mentioned in Intrinsic Necessitation, but I will focus here on plural constituents for the sake of clarity.
obtain when constituents are impure or mixed — as when a little coffee is added to some water, or when Adam’s body undergoes some revamping through the replacement of a hip with metal components — a stronger, general condition that requires complete coincidence cannot be justified.

With Intrinsic and Constituent Necessitation in place, we can now return to the question of the place of mereology in understanding compositional constitution. Consider first cases in which an entity is compositionally constituted by a plurality of entities, such that, in accord with Intrinsic Necessitation, there is some arrangement of those entities that itself necessitates the existence of that constituted entity. Here these constituent entities can be thought of individually as the smaller physical parts of the constituted entity, and collectively, once they are composed in the right way, as all there is materially to that entity. Since compositional constitution is a strict partial ordering, like the notion of a proper part in Mereology, we might look to rewrite our two distinctive conditions in terms of part-whole relations as follows:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \text{INTRINSIC NECESSITATION*}: the proper parts that compose \( y \) are so arranged during \( \pi \) that they themselves necessitate the existence of \( y \).
  \item \text{CONSTITUENT NECESSITATION*}: whenever \( y \) exists, there must be proper parts of \( x \)'s type that are (at least partially) spatially and materially coincident with \( y \).
\end{itemize}

For the same reason given earlier, it would be a mistake to view the arrangements of proper parts mentioned in Intrinsic Necessitation* to be themselves compositional constituents, on pain of inconsistency with Distinctness.

Whether there are adequate mereological reformulations of Intrinsic Necessitation and Constituent Necessitation in full turns on whether such formulations do justice to the other case that these conditions subsume, where an entity is compositionally constituted by something else, such as a piece of marble by some marble, or by a material object. My own sense is that it is at best awkward to recast the full version of at least Intrinsic Necessitation in terms of mereology, largely because it is strained to view masses, stuffs, and completely materially coincident entities as parts (proper or not) of what they constitute. Friends of Mereology, classical or contemporary, will no doubt disagree. What we can agree about, I suppose, is that if there can be physical constituents that are not themselves physical parts, then a mereological account will be at best only a partial view of compositional constitution.

5. Ampliative Constitution and the Many-Many Problem

Lynne Baker’s recent, detailed account of constitution is, in the terms I am using here, ampliative, and it is explicitly non-mereological.\(^{12}\) I suspect that Baker herself would readily accept something like Common Sense Ontology, for she views constitution as forming a part of a pluralistic, commonsense metaphysics that applies ubiquitously. On Baker’s view, constitution is to be understood principally in terms of the notions of spatial coincidence and existence conditions: one entity constitutes another (roughly) when they are spatially coincident yet they possess distinct conditions of existence. Before turning to refinements on this rough idea in a moment, consider a problem that any account of ampliative constitution, especially one that accepts Common Sense Ontology, must face.

This is what I call the \textit{many-many problem},\(^{13}\) the problem of specifying, of the many putative entities there are in the world (\textit{e.g.}, statues, works of art, valuable artifacts, works by Michelangelo) just which are constituted entities and just which are constituents of those entities (\textit{e.g.}, pieces of marble, aggregates of elementary particles, undifferentiated stuff). If there is a statue David in addition to the piece of marble that constitutes it (“Piece”), then is there also a work of art (“Art”), a valuable artifact (“Val”), and a sculpture by Michelangelo?

\(^{12}\) See the references in n. 7 above, for discussion of this aspect of Baker’s view.

\(^{13}\) The remainder of this paragraph and the following three paragraphs summarize a line of argument that I develop more fully and generally in my “Material Constitution and the Many-Many Problem”, \textit{Canadian Journal of Philosophy}, in press.
("Mick"), in addition to David? David is spatially and materially coincident with any of these other entities, and such pairs of entities also satisfy Distinctness. Similar points can be made with respect to David and various entities that putatively constitute it: there is Piece, let us suppose, but are there in addition smaller marble chunks, some undifferentiated stuff, and an aggregation of elementary particles, all of which satisfy both Coincidence and Distinctness?

Any account of what constitution is should provide some guidance as to when that relation holds between two or more entities, and so when it does not hold, and thus must face the many-many problem. If we accept cases in which one material entity constitutes another, how can we resist an explosion of our ontology that leads us to include other entities that are also constituents or constituted entities in those very cases?

The many-many problem is not simply a version of a standard objection to the appeal to amniotic constitution, namely, that its invocation abandons the sparseness explicit in Common Sense Ontology in implying that, say, when we face Michelangelo’s David there is both a statue and a piece of marble present before us – two objects, rather than one. The many-many problem presupposes that admitting both statues and pieces of marble in one’s ontology does not violate this aspect of Common Sense Ontology; it asks, rather, for a principled answer to the question of just which entities exist to stand in a relation of amniotic constitution in any given case.

The problem is perhaps better conveyed graphically and with the other paradigm example used in the literature. Consider Table 1. Assume that a person is constituted by a human body. Then why doesn’t that human body also constitute all of the other entities in the top row of the table? And why isn’t that person also constituted by all of the other entities in the bottom row of the table?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>person</th>
<th>living thing</th>
<th>member of</th>
<th>moral agent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Homo sapiens</td>
<td>biochemical molecules</td>
<td>causal network of bodily systems</td>
<td>an aggregate of cells</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1

The many-many problem is this: of the many entities we can view as putatively standing in a relation of amniotic constitution in any given instance, which in fact exist to stand in this relation? Since the problem is predicated on the supposition that persons are not simply human bodies in a certain state, and more generally that the familiar deflationary strategies for maintaining a “one-thing” rather than a “two-thing” ontology do not work, we cannot appeal to such strategies in addressing it. This makes the many-many problem a hard problem.

There are resources within Baker’s own view of constitution to construct one natural line of response to this problem, a response with affinities to the Aristotelian view that there are certain kinds of ontologically privileged thing in the world: substances. On Baker’s view, constitution holds between instances of what she calls primary kinds, where a thing’s (unique) primary kind tells us what that thing is most fundamentally or essentially. “Person” is the primary kind for anyone reading this paper, and “human body” the primary kind of the chunk of matter that we each typically refer to with the expression “my body”, according to Baker. Thus, a solution to the many-many problem should be developed in terms of which putative entities are instances of primary kinds.

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14. This expression of the many-many problem in terms of what exists in addition to a given constituent suggests that it doesn’t arise, or at least is much less pressing, for compositional constitution, which seems intuitively correct.

15. This sort of objection is common, and has been pressed by Eric Olson in several discussions of Baker’s views. See his Review of Baker’s Persons and Bodies, Mind 110 (2001): 427–30, and “Thinking Animals and the Constitution View”, e-symposium on Baker’s Persons and Bodies, http://host.uniroma3.it/progetti/kant/field/bakersymp.htm.

mary kinds. In Table 1, person and human body are primary kinds; the other putative entities are either identical to one or the other of these (perhaps moral agents are identical to persons), “modes” of those primary kinds (perhaps living things are “modes” of bodies), or not properly conceived of as kinds of entities at all (perhaps aggregates of cells).  

Although this strategy for addressing the many-many problem has some prima facie appeal in the case of persons and their bodies, it is fatally flawed as the basis for a general response to that problem; this flaw, in turn, highlights a respect in which the appeal to primary kinds restricts the applicability of the resulting account of ampliative constitution. The flaw can be conveyed succinctly by returning to the other paradigm example of ampliative constitution, that of David (the statue) and Piece (the piece of marble). Consider Table 2 as a depictive mnemonic for how the many-many problem applies here:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>David</th>
<th>Art</th>
<th>Val</th>
<th>Mick</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>work of art</td>
<td>valuable object</td>
<td>sculpture by Michelangelo</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Piece</td>
<td>smaller marble chunks</td>
<td>undifferentiated stuff</td>
<td>an aggregate of elementary particles</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2

The limitations of the appeal to primary kinds to solve the many-many problem should be apparent in this case. For here the very supposition that statue is the primary kind, and the other putative entities are non-primary in some way, cries out for some justification. The type of dependence that exists between entities and their “modes” does not hold between David and any of Art, Val, or Mick, yet the distinct conditions of existence for each of these entities implies that they are non-identi-

A Puzzle about Material Constitution

cal. Here the lack of generality to the appeal to primary kinds becomes apparent, for it is difficult to see what in the world could make David (rather than Art, Val, or Mick) an instance of a primary kind. Thus, an appeal to primary kinds cannot itself solve the many-many problem after all.

We can express the initial problem, the response implicit within Baker’s own framework, and why that response doesn’t work in terms of the analysis developed so far, in a way that extends that analysis. I have argued that any adequate notion of constitution must satisfy two conditions, Coincidence and Distinctness. Perhaps with a quibble about my appeal to material coincidence (though one that is appealed to), I hope, by my divorce of this notion from Mereology, Baker would seem to concur. Ampliative constitution also requires that there be some sense in which constituents necessitate what they constitute. But in contrast with the notion of compositional constitution, this necessitation is extrinsic:

**EXTRINSIC NECESSITATION:** \( x \) (the \( x \)s) is (are) in extrinsic conditions during \( p \) that themselves necessitate the existence of \( y \).

Again, Baker herself would seem to concur, given how she presents, defends, and clarifies her own appeal to the conditions in which a given entity is instantiated. Pieces of paper have to be in “dollar-friendly” circumstances, and pieces of marble in “statue-friendly” circumstances, if they are to constitute (respectively) dollars and statues. More precisely, such a piece of paper has to exist within a currency system that produces and recognizes such pieces of paper as having the value of a dollar, and be itself produced and recognized by the appropriate authorizing sources. A piece of marble that constitutes a statue must be produced through recognized artistic means, practices, and intentions, and perhaps for some other appreciative audience. We can debate precisely what such conditions are (or even whether there are precise conditions), but there is no dispute that they concern matter extrinsic to the constituent itself.

17. Baker herself, however, is content to consider at least some aggregates as belonging to primary kinds, such as the aggregate of molecules that constitute a river of water. See Persons and Bodies, p. 171–72, and ‘Precis’, p. 593, for example.
The many-many problem arises because even though these three conditions alone determine a constitution relation between entities such as dollar bills and pieces of paper, statues and pieces of marble, and even persons and their bodies, many other constituents for each of these constituted entities, and many other constituted entities for each of these constituents, satisfy all three conditions. In light of this, we need some other further constraint on ampliative constitution. Baker's account in effect provides something like Primary Kinds as such a constraint:

**Primary Kinds**: 

- **x** and **y** must be instances of distinct primary kinds, where a primary kind is what an entity is most fundamentally or essentially.

The problem with this strategy of response is that there seems no way to articulate what the primary kinds are of many of the entities that we might naturally appeal to in expressing sentences that appeal to ampliative constitution, as Table 2 illustrates. We can see the depth of the problem here more vividly perhaps by returning to (5) – (8):

5. Adam is constituted by organic molecules.

6. Michelangelo's David is constituted by some marble.

7. This gene is constituted by a sequence of DNA.

8. This island is constituted by a particular landmass.

While I have argued that it is far from obvious what the primary kind of even such a paradigm example as Michelangelo's David is, the same point holds of all of the examples that feature in these sentences. Baker is explicit that her account of constitution aims only to capture a relation that holds between individual things, and so would dismiss (6) outright as expressing a true relation of constitution, and may say the same about the plural constituents in (5). The requirement that “things” here be instances of primary kinds would also seem to make her account inapplicable to both (7) and (8), or at least beckon an answer to the question of what unique primary kinds a sequence (or strand) of DNA and a landmass belong to. Again, we have a variation on the general many-many problem: why is the primary kind of a particular gene, for example, *gene*, rather than (say) replicating molecule, nucleic acid, or inherited developmental resource? If (5) – (8) are properly viewed as relying on a concept of ampliative constitution, as I have been arguing, then the many-many problem highlights a way in which the addition of Primary Kinds to an analysis of that concept results in a view that departs significantly from the constraints specified by Common Sense Ontology.

6. The Relational/Intrinsic Constraint

Underlying the appeal to primary kinds, and the idea of ampliative constitution more generally, is the admittedly vague intuition that entities that are, in some sense, fundamentally different must bear a relation weaker than identity to one another. A statue is a fundamentally different kind of entity from a piece of marble, a person a fundamentally different kind of entity from a material body, and a gene a fundamentally different kind of entity from a strand of DNA. We can capture this intuition, however, without restricting our account of constitution to primary kinds or some other type of privileged ontological entity, and so develop constitution views more fully in keeping with Common Sense Ontology. The additional necessary condition we need is what I shall call the Relational/Intrinsic (R/I) Constraint:

**R/I**: **y** is relationally individuated and **x** (the **xs**) intrinsically individuated.

The resulting view of ampliative constitution, together with the view of compositional constitution articulated, provides an enriched set of...

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18. For Baker's restriction to individual things, see Persons and Bodies, pp. 33–34, which is my basis for thinking that she may deny that constitution can relate an individual thing to a plurality of things, as in (5), despite her consid-
resources for thinking about material constitution and introduces a promising strategy for addressing the many-many problem.

I begin with a rationale for the r/1 Constraint. A standard charge made against constitution views is that when x putatively constitutes y, y is simply identical with x in a certain intrinsic state. While I have assumed the robustness of standard replies to this kind of charge, the view I have developed acknowledges that there are cases of constitution that imply that there is a sense in which y is nothing more than x. The modal tie between coincident entities provided by both Constituent and Intrinsic Necessitation means that the corresponding concept of constitution, compositional constitution, in effect spells out the precise sense in which y is nothing more than x. But what of the parallel charge that in some cases y is simply x in certain extrinsic conditions—a statue, identical to a piece of marble in “statue-favorable” conditions, or a person identical to a human body in “person-favorable” conditions? Here an appeal to Distinctness will take us some way, as before, but a powerful way to avoid this charge would be to insist not simply that x and y satisfy Distinctness but that y’s existence conditions themselves include facts about the world beyond the spatial boundary that it shares with x. That is, these conditions should form part of y’s nature: they should, in part, metaphysically determine what it is to be a Y. This is just to say that y must be relationally individuated. But as a material constituent of y, x is individuated by what lies within y’s physical boundary; it is intrinsically individuated. Hence, we arrive at the r/1 Constraint, that when y is amplitudively constituted by x, y must be relationally individuated and x intrinsically individuated. This is true whether “x” here refers to an unqueasionable individual entity (a particular manland, a piece of marble), to a perhaps more questionable individual entity (a sequence or strand of DNA), to a mass of matter (some marble), or to a plurality of entities (organic molecules).

Although the r/1 Constraint is simple to state and is motivated by the above reasoning, it will pay to attend further to the issue of why it is a necessary condition on amplitudival constitution. Note first that r/1 is in fact satisfied by each of (B) and (6) – (8). But what of (5)

1. Adam is constituted by organic molecules.

20. For the general contrast between biological and psychological approaches, as well as the articulation of a particular biological approach, see Eric Olson, The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

A Puzzle about Material Constitution

Are there pairs of entities that stand in a relation of ampliative constitution where either the constituent is relationally individuated or the constituted entity is intrinsically individuated? If so, the r/1 Constraint is mistaken. Consider first examples of the latter kind.

Prima facie plausible candidates of this kind are difficult to think of and would violate both conditions for ampliative constitution. Such examples would violate Extrinsic Necessitation, which requires that there be extrinsic conditions that necessitate the existence of the constituted entity, since no intrinsically individuated entity can be so necessitated. I suspect that the only remotely plausible examples here will involve entities that are both individuated intrinsically. The broader view of constitution articulated here suggests a general strategy of response to any such putative counterexamples, a strategy that is independent of the particular analysis given of ampliative constitution: to argue that precisely because both entities are individuated in terms of what lies within their common physical boundary, if they stand in a relation of constitution, it is compositional rather than ampliative.

Consider now putative counterexamples of the former kind, the most plausible of which are those involving pairs of entities both of which are relationally individuated. By contrast with the case just discussed, putative counterexamples here are easy to generate: examples in which a person is ampliatively constituted by a living thing, a statue by a person, or an exotic theme park by the island that it exactly occupies. I think that the right thing to say about such examples is that all of these entities are ampliatively constituted by something (or some things), such as a human body or a landmass, that is intrinsically individuated, but that none of those relationally individuated entities constitutes any of the others; rather, they are merely spatially and materially coincident with one another. While pairs of such entities bear the something other than relation to one another (since they satisfy Distinctness and have different necessitating conditions), they do not stand in the something more than relation. There are two reasons for adopting this position.

The first is that, at an intuitive level, while the members of each of
these pairs of entities are distinct, they readily elicit the “nothing more than” intuitions that cases of compositional constitution elicit. Using a metaphor I have used before, such pairs of entities are “too close” to one another to stand in a relation of constitution that is ampliative. This metaphor can be unpacked (as before) in terms of Constituent Necessitation: there is prima facie plausibility to the claim that the existence of each of the putative constituents is necessitated by the particular entity that it constitutes: a living thing by that person, a person by a person-statue, and an island by that particular exotic theme park. The suggestion here is not that these entities stand in a relation of compositional constitution (they don’t, since they can’t satisfy Intrinsic Necessitation), but that our intuitions about them are confused, caught between a rock and a hard place.

The second reason articulates part of the basis of this confusion: that although such pairs of entities can be spatially and materially coincident, it is unclear whether they satisfy Coincidence, which requires in addition that constituents be completely material in themselves. Landmasses, bodies, pieces of marble, organic molecules, physical particles, as well as aggregations of any of them, are uncontroversially completely material in themselves. But is this true of the islands, persons, and statues that they can, in some circumstances, ampliatively constitute? Intuitively not, since they are completely material in virtue of being constituted by such uncontroversially completely material entities. Since this will be true of any relationally individuated entity that is materially constituted, such entities are ill suited to serve as material constituents.

7. Constitution as a Many-Many Relation

The many-many problem is a hard problem, one that, I have argued, cannot be solved by an appeal to primary kinds and that motivates an alternative development of the concept of ampliative constitution. While I do not have a full solution to the problem, I do want to indicate what can be said about it within the framework structured by the concepts of compositional and ampliative constitution.

First, consider what this framework implies about the entities mentioned in Tables 1 and 2. It is relatively easy to construct contexts in which any entity in the upper row of either of these tables — call them, respectively, the person row and the statue row — satisfies all four conditions (including r/1) for being ampliatively constituted by any entity in the lower row — call them, respectively, the body row and the marble row — of the corresponding table, and vice-versa.

Consider the person-row entities: persons, living things, members of Homo sapiens, and moral agents. In the last section I argued that persons were relationally individuated. Living things are individuated in part by properties such as having a metabolism, bearing adaptations, and having certain types of history; species membership is likewise determined by, amongst other things, phylogenetic history and reproductive isolation; and moral agents, whatever else they are, essentially have intentional mental states and interact with other social beings. All of these are relational properties of the individual entities that have them.\(^2\) Conversely, the body-row entities — human bodies, aggregates of cells, causal networks of bodily systems, and biochemical molecules — are intrinsically individuated. The same is true of the entities in Table 2: all of the statue-row entities — David, Art, Val, and Mick — are individuated relationally, while all of the marble-row entities — Piece, smaller marble chunks, undifferentiated stuff, and an aggregate of elementary particles — are individuated intrinsically. Thus, all of these examples satisfy r/1.

They also satisfy Extrinsic Necessitation. This is true even of constituents that are ‘arrangements’. In fact, not only is there no incoherence in viewing both Extrinsic Necessitation and r/1 as applying to arrangements, but there is no resulting inconsistency between Distinctness and Extrinsic Necessitation, as when, discussing com-

\(^2\) The relational nature of many biological kinds is widely recognized in the philosophy of biology. On organisms, see Robert A. Wilson, Genes and the Agents of Life: The Individual in the Fragile Sciences: Biology (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), especially chs. 3–4; on species, see the essays in Marc Ereshefsky (editor), The Units of Evolution: Essays on the Nature of Species (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
A Puzzle about Material Constitution

ROBERT A. WILSON

positional constitution, we saw there was between Distinctness and Intrinsic Necessitation. Thus, consider (15):

(15) David is constituted by an aggregate of elementary particles arranged just so.

The constituent here, like an aggregate of elementary particles itself, is individuated intrinsically. And inserting this constituent into Distinctness and Extrinsic Necessitation yields (16) and (17), both of which not only make perfect sense but are consistent:

(16) It is possible for an aggregate of elementary particles arranged just so to exist without there being a statue that is (even partially) spatially and materially coincident with that arrangement.

(17) An aggregate of elementary particles arranged just so is in extrinsic conditions during p that themselves necessitate the existence of David.

Since what necessitates the existence of David are extrinsic conditions (in accord with Extrinsic Necessitation), the necessitation relation specified in (17) allows for the possibility specified in (16), which would obtain just if those extrinsic conditions were absent. In general, there is always a way of being the material constituent(s) of a relationally individuated entity that does not itself necessitate the existence of that entity itself.

This seems to leave us stuck with the explosion of instances of ampliative constitution that is at the heart of the many-many problem. Yet how we should view this “explosion” turns in part on what kind of relationship exists between putative constituents, and what kind there is between putative constituted objects, i.e., on the relations between entities within each of the rows of Tables 1 and 2.

On my view of ampliative constitution, there can be no relations of ampliative constitution between either any body-row or any marble-row entities, or between any person-row or any statue-row entities, since none of these satisfy R/1. In the former cases, this is because no body-row or marble-row entities are relationally individuated; in the latter cases, this is because all person-row and statue-row entities are relationally individuated. If there is a constitutive relation between such within-row entities, it must be compositional constitution.

Is there a relation of compositional constitution here? For the constituent body-row and marble-row entities, yes. In fact, the compositional constitution is well suited for providing an account of how there can be many constituents for any given entity without ontological amplification. Consider the body-row entities. A human body is compositionally constituted by a causal network of bodily systems, which in turn bears that relation to aggregates of cells, which in turn bears that relation to biochemical molecules. In each case there are arrangements of the level n entities that necessitate the existence of entities at any level higher than n (Intrinsic Necessitation); likewise, the existence of an entity at level m necessitates the existence of at least some entities at any level lower than m (Constituent Necessitation). The same will be true of the marble-row entities. Since I have motivated compositional constitution by appeal to the intuition that an entity might be nothing more than its constituent(s), this tempers at least one half of the many-many problem, the half that concerns the putative one-many relation between entities and their constituents.

What of the other half of the problem, the one that concerns the one-many relation between a given constituent and the entities it constitutes? As I argued at the end of the previous section, since any two relationally individuated entities violate Intrinsic Necessitation, they cannot stand in a relation of compositional constitution. There I also questioned whether such entities satisfy Coincidence, rather than simply being spatially and materially coincident, since it seems doubtful that they are completely material in themselves. If that is right, then neither person-row nor statue-row entities can compositionally or ampliatively constitute anything else. Thus, the relationship between entities in each of these rows lies beyond the ken of a theory of constitution; we are left noting simply that they are spatially and materially coincident.
In summary, the response to the many-many problem is threefold. First, there is a clear sense in which ampliative constitution is a many-many relation. Second, since the constituents in this relation stand in the ancestral of the relation of compositional constitution to one another, the putative explosion in ontological commitments that this implies is at most only at the level of putatively constituted entities. And third, since there is a relation of neither compositional nor ampliative constitution between these entities, just what we should say about them lies outside of the theory of constitution itself. Whether this response can be developed into a more complete solution to the many-many problem is a task for another occasion.

8. Conclusion

I began with a puzzle about material constitution and a sketch of its solution; the details of that solution, occupying the core of the paper, result in an enriched view of constitution. To recap, return to the contrast between (A) and (B), one that, I have argued, represents a more general contrast between uses of “is constituted by” and cotate expressions, such as “is made of”, “is made up of”, “consists of”, or “is composed of”, and that was exemplified by a range of other appeals to material constitution (e.g., in sentences (1) – (8)).

(A) The liquid in this glass is constituted by molecules of water.

(B) The statue in front of me, David, is constituted by a piece of marble.

The puzzle was why (A) could be readily and naturally interpreted as implying that the liquid in the glass is nothing more than molecules of water, while just the opposite was true of (B), which is readily and naturally interpreted as implying that David is something more than a piece of marble. The solution to that puzzle that I have suggested is that (A) and (B) draw on different concepts of constitution, compositional and ampliative constitution, concepts with distinct overall analyses that share two necessary conditions, Coincidence and Distinctness:

COINCIDENCE: x is completely material in itself, or the xs are completely material in themselves, and y is spatially and materially coincident with x (the xs) during p.

DISTINCTNESS: it is possible for x (the xs) to exist without there being anything of y’s type that is (even partially) spatially and materially coincident with x (the xs).

A pair of further necessary conditions characterize each of compositional and ampliative constitution. The concept in (A), compositional constitution, has Intrinsic and Constituent Necessitation as distinguishing necessary conditions, both of which admit at least partially of a mereological formulation:

INTRINSIC NECESSITATION: x is in some intrinsic state(s), or the xs that compose y are arranged, during p such that x itself, or the xs themselves, necessitate the existence of y.

CONSTITUENT NECESSITATION: whenever y exists, there must be something of x’s type that is (at least partially) spatially and materially coincident with y.

Since both of these conditions further temper any putative implication of Distinctness that x and y are (really) separate entities — that is, further than Coincidence does already — they articulate a concept of constitution that narrows the ontological gap between constituents and what they constitute, which is just what one might expect of a concept underlying the “nothing more than” intuition elicited by (A). In fact, the gap here is so narrow that the individual constituents (in certain intrinsic states) and the plural constituents (arranged just so) specified by Intrinsic Necessitation can never themselves satisfy Distinctness.

By contrast, the concept in (B), ampliative constitution, has Extrinsic Necessitation and p/s as distinguishing necessary conditions, conditions that direct one not to the part-whole relation but to contextual and relational features of both the constituent and the entity it constitutes.
EXTRINSIC NECESSITATION: x (the xs) is (are) in extrinsic conditions during p that themselves necessitate the existence of y.

R/1: y is relationally individuated and x (the xs) intrinsically individuated.

Since both of these conditions further temper any putative implication of Coincidence that x and y are (really) strictly identical entities — that is, further than Distinctness does already — they articulate a concept of constitution that widens the ontological gap between constituents and what they constitute, which is just what one might expect of a concept underlying the “something more than” intuition elicited by (B). In fact, the gap here is so wide that no matter what intrinsic state an individual constituent is in, and no matter how a plural constituent is arranged, they will always satisfy Distinctness.

One of the implications of the view defended here is that “is constituted by” and cognate expressions introduce a potential ambiguity in the sentences in which they feature.24 Consider (B) again. In contrast to the context of utterance for (B) with which I began the paper — one in which the speaker is reflecting on the aesthetic power of Michelangelo’s sculptures — one might imagine a context in which the speaker is trying to convince a hearer that there is no magical or mystical property that imbues Michelangelo’s David with its aesthetic grace, and says (B), where this might best be paraphrased not as (B*) but as (B‡):

(B‡) The statue in front of me, David is nothing more than a piece of marble.

In this context, however, (B) is plausibly taken to rely not on amplitud

tive but on compositional constitution. If the account of the difference between amplitudative and compositional constitution provided here is correct, there is a corresponding shift across these two contexts in how the constituted entity, the statue David, is conceptualized. In the original context in which (B) and (B*) are used to express the same thought, David is thought of as an entity whose nature is not simply a function of how its constituents are organized or arranged, as we might expect of something that is relationally individuated. By contrast, in the context sketched here in which (B) and (B‡) are used to express the same thought, David is thought of as an entity whose nature is a function of such organization or arrangement — not a metaphysically adequate thought about David (as opposed, say, to the piece of marble that constitutes it), but one that allows a conversation to proceed and typifies a common epistemic shortcut that facilitates communication.

How widespread amplitudative constitution so articulated is will turn on just how widespread relational individuation is. My own view, implicit in the discussion of the virtues of the r/1 constraint in section 6, is that relational individuation is prevalent, and includes many biological and artifactual kinds as well as social and non-living kinds of thing.25 If that view is correct, then amplitudative constitution may hold between entities in many domains. Together with the ubiquity of compositional constitution, this gives the view articulated here the kind of ontological reach that a view according with Common Sense Ontology should have.

Finally, if the “two concept” view does provide a framework that systematically makes sense of conflicting intuitions concerning material constitution, and allows us to make some progress in thinking about related problems such as the many-many problem, then the distinction between amplitudative and compositional constitution will not only find a place in the toolkit that proponents of constitution views in

24. This ambiguity, in turn, creates the potential for equivocation in arguments that rely on “the” notion of constitution. For a discussion of such potential in the context of a discussion of whether constitution is transitive, see my “The Transitivity of Material Constitution”, MS.

metaphysics carry with them; perhaps it will also win a few converts to constitution views more generally.26

References

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Wilson, Robert A., MS, “The Transitivity of Material Constitution”.

